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THE RENVOITHEORY AND THE APPLICA-
TION OF FOREIGN LA W.r 
I. Renvoi IN GENERAL. 
No question in the Conflict of Laws has given to the jurists of 
continental Europe greater difficulty during the last thirty years 
than the so-called 1·envoi theory. The following example may 
serve to suggest the problem. Suppose a citizen of the United 
States, formerly a resident of the State of New York, dies domi-
ciled in Italy, leaving personal property in the State of New 
York, and that a question arises before the New York courts with 
respect to the distribution of such property The obvious answer 
is : The lex fori having adopted the rule that the law of the domi-
cile of the deceased at the time of his death shall govern the dis-
tribution of his personal estate, Italian law is to be applied. But 
what is meant by Italian law? Is the New York judge to apply 
the Italian statute of distributions, or is he directed by the lex fori 
to apply Italian law in its totality, i. e., including its rules govern-
ing the Conflict of Laws? Should the lex fori refer to Italian law 
in the latter sense it would be found that in the Italian system of 
Private International Law the lex patrice has supplanted the 
le.1: domicilii in the present instance. If the question came before 
an Italian judge the personal estate would be distributed in ac-
cordance with the law of the country of which the deceased was a 
citizen or subject at the time of his death, that is, New York law. 
The view that under the above circumstances the New York 
judge should apply the statute of distributions of his own State 
is generally known as the renvoi theory. It should be observed at 
the very outset that the term renvoi is used as a convenient de-
scriptive term denoting that the judge of the forum is to take ac-
count of the rules of Private International Law prevailing in the 
country to which the lex fori refers, without regard to any par-
ticular theory or to the particular law which may be deemed to 
control in the end. Unless the contrary appears, this wider mean-
ing will attach to the term renvoi in the present article. In its 
strict sense it would imply that the foreign law, having jurisdiction 
in the matter, had referred the case back to the lex fori. 
1The Journal du droit international prive will be referred to in this 
article by "Clunet," the Revue de droit international prive et de droit 
penal international, by "Darras," the Zeitschrift fiir internationales Privat-
tmd Strafrecht, by "Niemeyer," and the Amwaire de l'Institut de droit 
international, by "Annuaire." 
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The problem is a general one and is not confined to those 
branches of the law in which the lez domicilii and the lex patria! 
clash (status, succession, etc.). It arises whenever the rules of 
Private International Law of the countries in question differ. The 
question, therefore, is: Must the judge when the law of the 
forum prescribes the application of a foreign law take notice of 
the rules governing the Conflict of Laws in such foreign country, 
and, if he must, in what sense and to what extent? 
Notwithstanding its fundamental nature in the science of Pri-
vate International Law the above question was not raised by the 
earlier writers on the subject, though occasion was not wanting.2 
They appear to have assumed that in the nature of things the rules 
of Private International Law were to point out the law which 
should itself distribute the property, determin~ the capacity, de-
cide upon the validity of a marriage, etc., and thus called for the 
application of the internal or territoriaP law of the foreign State 
to the exclusion of its rules of Private International Law. Even 
in modern times the same assumption appears to have been made 
by the continental jurists as well as by those of England and the 
United States. It was not until the adoption of the renvoi doctrine 
by the French Court of Cassation in the Forgo case, decided in 
1882/ that the problem attracted the serious attention of the 
jurists.5 From this time on until its rejection by the Institute of In-
'There were differences of view as to whether a statute was real 
or personal, whether the domicile of origin or the actual domicile should 
govern, as to whether the rule locus regit actmn was imperative or not, 
etc. See Laine, bztroduction att droit international prive. 2 vols., I888, 
I892. 
"The word "territorial" in this article denotes the municipal law of a 
country exclusive of its rules governing the Conflict of Laws. 
'This case, which gave rise to much litigation in France, was set at 
rest through two decisions of the Court of Cassation, D. I879, I, 56; D. 
I882, I, 30I. It involved succession to personal property left in France 
by a Bavarian subject, who was domiciled de facto in France, though he 
had not acquired an authorized domicile there. Under the French law, 
the lex patrice governed under the circumstances. It being proved, however, 
that the courts of Bavaria would distribute the property in accordance 
with the lex domicilii, it was held that French law became applicable. 
"The eminent Belgian jurist, Laurent, appears to have been the first to 
call attention to the error underlying the renvoi theory. See his note to 
App. Brussels, May I4, I88I, S. I88r, 4, 4I. But it was J. E. Labbe, a 
distinguished professor of the University of Paris, who, in an article en-
titled "D1t conflit entre la loi nationale dtt juge saisi et une loi etrangere 
relativement a la determination de la loi applicable a la cause" (I2 Clunet 
5-I6), in which he disagreed with the conclusion of the Court of Cassation 
in the Forgo case, raised the issue in such a forceful manner that it could 
thereafter no longer be ignored. 
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ternational Law at its session at Neuchatel in 1900, the rem•oi 
theory, by reason of its fundamental character in the application 
of foreign law, has occupied the first rank in the theoretical dis-
cussions relating to the Conflict of Laws. 
Long before the Forgo case similar conclusions had been 
reached in EnglandG and in Germany,7 while contemporaneously 
therewith the Court of Appeals of Brussels, in Bigwood v.Bigwood,8 
introduced the same doctrine into the jurisprudence of Belgium. 
In all of these cases, it would seem, neither counsel for the inter-
ested parties nor the courts were aware of the fact that the appli-
cation of foreign law could mean anything but foreign law in its 
totality. The Bigwood case has been followed consistently in Bel-
gium ever since.9 The Forgo case has been followed by the lower 
courts of France10 until recently, when, as a result of the strong 
sentiment against the doctrine entertained by the French jurists, 
two Courts of Appeal have held to the contrary.U The French 
Court of Cassation has had no other occasion to pass upon the 
question. The earlier cases in Germany agreed with the Court of 
Liibeck in sanctioning ren.voi/2 but the later cases took strong ex-
•c oilier v. Rh:az ( r84r) 2 Curt. Ecc. 855. 
'OLG Lubeck, March 21, r86r (14 Seuffert's Arclzi-;; r64). 
"App. Brussels, May 14, r88r (Belgique ludiciaire, r88r, p. 758). 
•Trib. Civ. Brussels, March 2, r887 ( 14 Clunet 748), succession; App. 
Brussels, Dec. 24, 1887 (D. r889, 2, 97), legitimation-reserve; Trib. Nivel-
les, Feb. 19, 1879 (Belgique ludiciaire, r88o, p. 982), succession; Trib. 
Civ. Brussels, Dec. r, 1894 (23 Clunet 895), grounds for divorce; Trib. 
Civ. Antwerp, March r6, r89s (23 Clunet 655), jurisdiction for divorce. 
10Trib. Civ. Seine, May 19, r888 (rs Clunet 791), status-interdiction 
(semble); App. Paris, March 23, r888 (D. r889, 2, II7), status-legitima-
tion; Trib. Civ. Seine, July 26, 1894 (21 Clunet 1007), status-filiation 
(obiter); Trib. Civ. Tunis, March 25, 1890 (r8 Clunet 238), form of dona-
tion (obiter); Trib. Civ. Seine, April 6, 1894 (21 Clunet 531), status-
judicial council; App. Paris, July 31, r895 ( S. r899, 2, ros), status-
judicial council (semble); App. Lyons, July 29, r898 (26 Clunet 569), 
patronymic name; App. Douai, Feb. 2, r889 (26 Clunet 825), succession 
to movables; App. Paris, March 15, r889 (26 Clunet 794), status-inter-
diction (semble),· Trib. Civ. Seine, Dec. 4, r889 (27 Clunet 368), succes-
sion to movables; Trib. Pau, April 19, 1901 (29 Clunet 858), wills-ca-
pacity; Trib. Civ. Marseilles, July 19, 1905; App. Aix, July 19, 19o6 (34 
Clunet 152), succession to immovab!es. 
11App. Paris, Aug. r, 1905 (D. 1906, 2, r69), succession to movables; 
App. Pau, June II, 19o6 (D. 1907, 2, I), wills-validity-legitimate por-
tion; see also Trib. Civ. Seine, Feb. ro, r893 (20 Clunet 530), capacity. 
"'RG Jan. 27, r888 (20 RG 351), succession; RG Feb. 4, 1892 (2 Nie-
meyer 469), testamentary successiOn; Carlsruhe, Oct. r6, 1885 (51 Ba-
disclze Annalen 373, cited in 30 Ihering's lalzrbiiclzer fiir die Dogmatik 12), 
succession. 
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ception to the doctrine.13 The change of view was noticeable also 
in the decisions of the Court of the Empire. Since rgoo the ques-
tion has been settled in Germany by the provisions of Articles 27 
and 28 of the Law of Introduction to the German Civil Code, 
which will be considered hereafter. In Switzerland the Supreme 
Court has rejected renvoi with respect to foreign countries,14 but 
it has sanctioned it with regard to inter-cantonallaw.15 Renvoi has 
been sanctioned recently also by a lower court of Spain16 and of 
Portugal,17 but it has been rejected by the courts of Italy.18 As 
to non-continental countries, exclusive of England and the United 
States, renvoi conclusions were reached only in the case of Ross v. 
Ross, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada.10 
An examination of the cases supporting the view that the rules 
of the Conflict of Laws call for the application of foreign law in its 
totality reveals in the first place the fact that in all of them the court 
was thereby enabled to apply its own law. It is noticeable also that 
in the great majority of cases in which it prevailed the lex domi-
cilii came into copflict with the principle of nationality. Most of 
the cases related to succession, intestate or testamentary. There 
appears to be no case in Belgium, France or Germany in which 
renvoi was allowed with respect to contracts or property rights; 
in the cases in which such contention was made it was disallowed. 
In regard to succession, it has been applied in France both to 
movable and immovable property. In its application to form 
(locus regit actum) the remarks of the Civil Court of Tunis and 
of the Supreme Court of Canada, in Ross v. Ross, favoring the 
application of renvoi were really obiter and led, in Ross v. Ross, 
"'RG May 31, 188g (24 RG 326), guardianship; RG April 24. 1894 (S 
Niemeyer 58), testamentary succession; RG March 3, 18g6 (36 RG 205), 
succession; RG July II, 18g8 ( 9 Niemeyer n6), divorce-alimony; OLG 
Karlsruhe, Oct. 23, 1897, and RG Apr. 19, 18g8 (9 Niemeyer 134), suc-
cession; LG Strassburg, Oct. 31, 18g2 (3 Niemeyer 416), succession; 
LG Strassburg, June 13. 1892 (3 Niemeyer 520), testamentary succession; 
OLG Kolmar, May 19, 1893 (4 Niemeyer 151), contract. 
"Bmzdesgericht, April 6, 1894 (25 Clunet 1095), capacity. 
10Bmzdesgericht, March 27, 1895 (37 Zeitschrift fur Schweizerisches 
Recht 24), matrimonial property. 
'"Barcelona, August 3, 1900 (28 Clunet 9n), succession. The court 
decided the case upon the opinion of a Spanish jurist, who himself mis-
understood the attitude of the Conference of the Hague in regard to 
re11voi. 
'"Lisbon, Apr. 6, 1907 (35 Clunet 367), succession. 
"'Cass. Rome, Jan. 5, 1906 (34 Clunet 1205), capacity; Trib. Salerno. 
June 6, 1899 (65 Archivo Giuridico 349), succession. 
10 (1894) 25 Can. S. C. 307. 
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to the filing of a strong dissenting opinion on that point by Justice 
Taschereau. 
The case-law, then, as it stands to-day, outside of England and 
the United States, gives support to the doctrine that foreign law 
means the law in its totality only in the cases in which the le:c domi-
cilii and the le.x patri(J! come into conflict and the judge is thereby 
enabled to apply his own law. And even as thus limited the doctrine 
finds real support only in the decisions of Belgium and of France. 
In view of the almost complete consensus of juristic opinion against 
renvoi in France, it is probable, moreover, that when the question 
is presented to the Court of Cassation another time, it will reverse 
the doctrine of the Fm·go case.20 
Before the adoption of the German Civil Code renvoi was 
recognized by way of legislation only in isolated instances. It ex-
isted to some extent in several of the Swiss cantons21 and it was 
contained also in section I08 of the Hungarian law of December 
18, 1894, relating to marriage.22 Japan has followed the example 
of the German Code with respect to renvoi. 23 Elsewhere there 
appears to be no legislative support for the doctrine. 
The opinion of textwriters is overwhelmingly in favor of the 
doctrine that the rules of Private International Law refer to the 
internal or territorial law of the foreign country exclusive of its 
rules governing the Conflict of Laws.24 The conclusion to be de-
""Very recently the Court of Cassation, in order to bring the law into 
harmony with juristic opinion, changed its former view regarding the 
rule locus regit actum in its application to wills. Cass. Aug. II, 1909 (36 
Clunet 1097). 
:nsee, I Meili, Internationales Civil-und Handelsrecl!t, 171. 
""See Annuaire de Legislation Etrangere, 1895, p. 377· 
"'Art. 29 of the Law of Ho-rei, of June 15, r898. See Yamada, 28 Clunet 
635· 
"AusTRALIA. In favor: Brown, 25 Law Quar. Rev. 148, 153. 
AusTRIA-HUNGARY. Against: Rostworowski, r8 Annuaire 176; de 
Roszkowski, r8 Amutaire 176; Strisower, 17 Anmwire r8n. 
BJ>LGIU:M. In favor: Rolin, Principes de droit intenzational prive, vol. 
I, p. 258; I7 Annuaire 215-216; de Paepe, Revue de droit international et de 
legislation comparee, rgoo, p. 378. Against: Laurent, S. r88r, 4, 41. 
BRAZIL. In favor: Beoilaqua, Elementos de dirdto internacional pri-
vado, rgo6, § 20. Against: Carvalho, Nova consolidacao das leis civis, art. 
25, § I; Octavio, Direito do estrangeiro no Brazil, 1909, n. 323. 
CuBA. In favor: P. Desvernine, Una consulta de derecho inte_rnacional 
privado r8go, pp. 17-18 (cited by Bustamante, El orden pubhco, 159). 
Against: Bustamante, El orden publico, 167; 17 Amwaire 219-220; N. 
Trelles, Una conmlta de derecho civil, 51 (cited by Bustamante, El orden 
pnblico r6o). 
ENGLAND. In favor: Dicey, Conflict of Laws (2d ed.) 715-716; West-
lake, Private International Law (4th ed.) 25-40; 17 Amwaire 217-219; 
r8 Alllwaire 35-40, 164-168. Against: Bate, Notes on th~ doctrine of 
Renvoi in Priv. Int. Law, London, 1904; Holland, r8 Amwmre 176. 
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rived from the great mass of juristic literature which has grown 
up since Labbe drew attention to the question may be stated in 
the words of that distinguished Dutch statesman and jurist, 
Asser: 
FRANCE. In favor: Weiss, Traite de droit intemational phve, vol. 3, pp. 
77-8I; I8 Annuaire I5o-I5I; Chausse, Revue critique de legislation et de 
jurispmdence, I888, p. I97; 24 Clunet 23; Vareilles-Sommieres, La Synt/zese 
dtt droit intemational prive, vol. 2, pp. 97-98. Against: Audinet, Principes 
elementaires de droit internation<Jl prive (2d ed.) Nos. 3I4-3I6; s. I899, 2, 
I05; Bartin, 30 Revtee de droit international et de legislation comparee, I29-
I87, 272-3IO; D. I8g8, 2, 28I; Baudry-Lacantinerie and Houques-Fourcade, 
Traite des persomzes (2d ed.), vol. I, No. 207 (formerly favoring renvoi); 
Chretien, I3 Clunet I74, n. 2; De Boeck, D. I88g, 2, 97; Despagnet, Precis 
de droit international prive (4th ed.), No. Io6; 25 Clunet 263-264; Dupuis, 
I8 Anmtaire I76; Descamps, I8 Amzuaire I76; Fauchille, I8 Ammaire I76; 
Labbe, I2 Clunet 5-I6; Laine, 23 Clunet 24I-26I, 48I-494; 2 Darras 005-
643; 3 Darras 43-72, 3I3-339, 66I-674; 4 Darras 729-758; 5 Darras I2-40; 
I7 Annuaire I4-36; I8 Ann'teaire 34; Ligeoix, 30 ·Clunet 48I-498, 3I Clunet 
55I-567; l;'ic, D. I899, 2, 4IO; Pillet, 2! Clunet 72I; s. r8g6, 2, 75; I7 An-
mtaire 220-22I; I8 Ammaire I48-I50; Principes de droit intemational prive, 
Nos. 63-66; Droit intemational prive 239-242; Lyon-·Caen, I8 Anmtaire 
I76; Renault, I8 Ammaire I76; Surville et Arthuys, Cours elementaire de 
droit intemational prive (3d ed.), 49. 
GERMANY. In favor: v. Bar, Tlteorie tmd Praxis des i1zternationalen 
P1·ivatrechts 279-28I; 2 Holtzendorff's Encyclopiidie der Rechtswissensc/zaft 
(6th ed. by Kohler), I9; 8 Niemeyer, I77-I88; I8 Annuaire 4I, I53-I57; 
I74-I75; Barazetti, 8 N:iemeyer 35-36; Dernburg, Das biirgerliche Recht des 
deutsclzen Reichs tend Preuss ens, vo!. I, p. 97; Keidel, 28 Clunet 82-g6; Har-
burger, I8 Amwaire I76; Neumann, Verhandltmgen des deutschen fteristen-
tages, r8g8, I, p. I87; Schnell, 5 Niemeyer 337-343. Against: Enneccerus, 
Verhandltmgm des detetsc/zan Juristentages, I8g8, J; pp. 76, 95-97; Gierke, 
Detttsches Privatreclzt, vol. I, p. 2I5; Kahn, 30 Ihermg's J ahrhilcher fiir die 
Dogmatik 9-34; 36 id. 366-4o8; 40 id. 56-69; 45 Kritische Vierteljahressclzrift 
fiir Gesetzgebmtg 62o-623; Klein, 27 Archiv fiir biirgerliches Recht 252-282; 
v. Liszt, I8 Annuaire 176; Mitteis, Verhandltmgen des deutsclzen Juristen-
tages I8g8, I, pp. 76, 95-97; Niemeyer, Methodik I5-I7; Niemeyer Kodi-
fikation 82-86; Planck, Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (3d ed.), vol. 6, p. I04; 
Regelsberger, Pandekten, vol. I, pp. I64-I65; Silberschmidt, 8 Niemeyer 
roo-Ior; Zitelmann, Internationales Privatreclzt, vol. I, pp. 242-243. 
The German Bar Association pronounced itself against renvoi with 
respect to contracts. Verlzandltmgen des deutsches Juristentages, I8g8, iv, 
p. I27. (The arguments advanced against renvoi would apply with equal 
force to all other branches of the law.) 
GREECE. Against: Streit, I8 Ammaire I62-I64; 6 Niemeyer Ig8. 
HoLLAND. Against: Asser, 32 Clunet 40; I8 Ammaire I59-I6I. 
ITALY. In favor: Brusa, I7 Anmtaire 227-228; I8 Ammaire I77; Fiore, 
28 Clunet 424-442; 68I-704- Against: Anzilotti,' Sttedi critici di diritto in-
tenzazionale privata I94 (cited by Buzzati, Trattato di diritto int. privata 
secondo le convmzioni dell'Aja, I, p. Irrn); Buzzati, Revue de droit in-
ternational et de legislation comparee, I90I, pp. 272-278; Trattato di 
diritto intemazionale privata secondo le convenzioni dell'Aja, I, pp. I05-
I20); 8 Niemeyer 449-456; rr Niemeyer 3-I5; I7 Ammaire I4-36; I8 An-
nuaire 43, I46, I 52, I67, I68; Catellani, I8 Ammaire I69-I70; Corsi, I8 An-
meaire I76; Fedozzi, 65 Arclzivo Gittridico 352; Fusinato, I7 Ammaire I8n: 
Olivi, Remee de droit intemational et de legislation comparee, I900, pp. 
3I-32; I7 Ammaire I8n; Pierantoni, I7 Annuaire IBn; Sacerdoti, I7 An-
nuaire I8n. 
PoRTUGAL. In favor: da Veiga Beirao, 35 Clunet 367. Against: Midosi, 
I8 Amzuaire I76. 
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"The science of Private International Law * * * must 
designate the law applicable to each jural relationship. We have 
no hesitancy in declaring that in our opinion the learned juris-
consults who have opposed the system of renvoi have proved 
in an irrefutable manner that the science of Private International 
Law has for its aim the direct designation of the very law which 
is to govern the legal relationship and that its aim must not consist 
merely in referring to the rules governing the Conflict of Laws in 
such country. 
"When the science teaches us, for example, that the status of 
an individual is governed by his national law, it is the national law 
regulating the status that is meant, and not a disposition of the 
national law which might declare another law, for example, that 
of the domicile of the individual, applicable to this status. 
"The science, in declaring applicable the national law, or the 
law of the situation of the property, or any other law, has been 
guided by considerations derived from the nature of the legal re-
lationship in question. It is, therefore, the law itself indicated by 
it that must be applied, and not another law to which it refers and 
which could not have been considered by the science."25 
The question of renvoi was discussed by the members of the 
Institute of International Law at its sessions at The Hague in 
1898/6 and at Neuchatel in 1900.27 Article I of the final conclu-
sions submitted by the very able report of Laine and Buzzati, 
"rapporteurs" of the commission to which the question had been 
committed for preliminary study reads : 
"When a legislator, laying down a rule of Private International 
Law, indicates a rule of foreign civil law as being directly applica-
ble by his courts, he must not subordinate the application of this 
rule to the condition that it is prescribed also by the foreign legis-
lation, of which the rule of civil law so indicated forms a part."28 
Great difference of opinion arose with respect to the exact 
meaning of the above conclusion, the doubt relating mainly to the 
RusSIA. In favor: Ivanowsky, 17 Anmwire I6n. 
SERVIA. Against: Vesnitch, IS Amwaire I76. 
SPAIN. In favor: de Dios Trias, 28 Clunet 905-9II ; Torres Campos, I7 
Annuaire I6n. 
SwiTZERLAND. In favor: I Brocher, Cours de droit i1ztenzational prive 
I67; Wolf, 37 Zeitschrift fiir schwdzerisches Reclzt 20-24; Roguin, 18 An-
nuaire I7o-I72; Boiceau, IS Amwaire Ij6. Against: Hilty, IS Annuaire 
I76; Kebedgy, IS Amwaire I76; Lehr, 18 A111waire I76; Meili, Das Inter-
nationale Civil-und Ha1zdelsrecht I68-I6g; International Civil and Com-
mercial Law (trans!. by Ruhn), 372. 
UNITED STATES. Agai1zst: E. H. Abbott, Jr. 24 Law Quart. Rev. I33, 
146; 20 Harv. L. Rev. 227. 
2032 Clunet 40-41. 
"'I7 Annuaire 14-36, 2I2·230. 
"'IS Amzttaire 34-4I, 145-178. 
""r8 Annuaire 34. 
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question whether it referred to actual law or embodied merely an 
abstract principle. At the end of the discussion it was decided to 
vote first upon the principle contained in Article r. The principle 
rejecting renvoi was adopted by a vote of 22 to 6.29 The resolu-
tion finally passed with practical unanimity was expressive of a 
mere wish, and reads as follows : 
"When the law of a State governs a conflict of laws in the 
matter of private law it is desirable that it should designate the 
rule of law to be applied in each case and not the. foreign rule 
governing the conflict in question."30 
Courts admitting renvoi have said that in the application of 
foreign law the judge should consider himself as sitting in 
the foreign country.31 Thus interpreted the lex domicilii, for ex-
ample, would be equivalent to a declaration on the part of the lex 
fori that the case in reality belongs to the State in which the domi-
cile has been established, whose law in its totality would, there-
fore, necessarily govern. \iVhatever its rule of Private Interna-
tional Law on the point in question, it would on principle be bind-
ing upon the judge of the forum, subject to such limitation as the 
public policy of the forum might establish. If, therefore, the for-
eign law should have substituted the le:c patri(J! for the le:c domi-
cilii in its Private International Law, the judge of the forum would 
have to follow the directions of such foreign law, which, accord-
ing to the circumstances of the case, might lead to the application 
of the law of the forum or to that of a third country. When the 
judge of the forum is thus sent back by the foreign law to the 
le:c fori we wou1d have true renvoi; when he is directed to apply 
the la\V of a third State it would be a case of transmission, or, to 
use the equivalent German term generally employed, }Veiterver-
weismzg. 
From a theoretical standpoint the fatal objection to the applica-
tion of foreign law in its totality in the sense that the judge of 
the forum is to regard himself for the purpose in question as a 
judge of the country to which the le:r: fori refers is, that upon 
"'The following jurists voted in favor of the principle: Asser, Boi-
ceau, Zuzzati, Catellani, Corsi, Descamps, Dupuis, Fauchille, Hilty, Hol-
land, Kebedgy, Lehr, de Liszt, Lyon-Caen, Midosi, Renault, Rostworowski, 
de Roszkowski, Sacerdoti, Streit, and Vesnitch. 
The following voted against the principle, that is, in favor of t·envoi: 
v. Bar, Brusa, Harburger, Roguin, Weiss, \Vestlake. See 18 Amwaire 
176-177. 
3018 Amwaire 179. 
"'Collier v. Rivaz (1841) 2 Curt. Ecc. 855; Liibeck, March 21, 1861 
(14 Seuffert's Archiv, 164); RG, January 27, 1888 (20 RG 351). 
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strict principles of logic it can lead to no solution of the problem. 
Suppose, for example, a Dane is domiciled in Italy, where he dies, 
leaving personal property in Denmark, and that the question pend-
ing in a Danish court involves the distribution of such estate. 
Under the above theory the Danish law would direct its courts to 
apply the lex domicilii, i. e., Italian law in its totality. As under 
Italian law the lex patrice of the deceased is to govern the dis-
tribution of his property, the Danish judge should logically be 
referred back to Danish law in its totality, for the lex domicilii in 
the Conflict of Laws cannot be deemed to have one meaning and 
the lex patrice another. Both must refer either to the internal or 
material law of the foreign country or to the foreign law inclusive 
of its Private International Law. 
" 'Otherwise,' as the report of the first commission of the In-
stitute of International Law well expressed it, 'one would fall into 
the absurdity of having to admit that a legislative provision estab-
lishes one thing when it is applied by the national judge and an 
entirely different thing when it is applied by a foreign judge; that 
a rule of international law changes its meaning, nature, function 
as soon as it passes the frontiers of the State in which it was prom-
ulgated.' "32 
There would appear to be no escape in legal theory from this 
circle or endless chain of references.33 Even Westlake 34 and 
v. Bar,S5 who favor renvoi in another form, have recognized the 
impossibility of breaking the chain upon principle after the first 
reference. The courts that have sanctioned renvoi actually break 
it in this place and allow the foreign law to have the last word in 
"'17 Amwaire 25. 
Where the foreign law, instead of sending the judge of the forum 
back to his own law, would refer him to the law of a third country, he 
"would be obliged, 'to use again the language of the First Commission 
of the Institute of International Law,' either to travel over half of the 
universe with his investigation, pasing from renvoi to renvoi, or, according 
to circumstances, he would encounter two foreign laws, each of which 
in turn sending the decision to the other, without finding any ground for 
preferring one to the other." I7 Ammaire 26. 
""See Audinet, Principes elementaires de droit international prive (2d. 
ed.), 234; S. I8gg, 2, ros; Bartin, Revue de droit international et de 
legislation comparee 144; Buzzati, I8 Anmtaire 146; Kahn, 30 Ihering's 
Jahrbiicher fiir die Dogmatik 23; Laine, 23 Clunet 257; 3 Darras 48; 
Ligeoix 30 Clunet 485; Pillet, Principes de droit internatio-nal prive I6I; 
Droit international prive 24I; I Regelsberger, Pandekten r64-I65. 
This theory has been appropriately described as involving a game of 
battledore and shuttlecock (I Regelsberger, Pandekten I64), or as in-
ternational lawn-tennis (Buzzati, I8 Ammaire I46). 
"'Westlake, Private International Law (4th ed.), 31. 
""v. Bar, Theory and Practice of Private International Law (Gilles-
pie's trans!.), 209n. 
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the matter, a view approved by Professor Weiss of the Ecole de 
Droit, Paris,36 and by Dicey/7 but this is only an expedient re-
sorted to in order to reach a solution. But even if there were 
nothing illogica!38 in breaking off after the first reference, the 
strongest scientific reasons, to be considered hereafter, would speak 
against the doctrine of renvoi in this form. 
From a practical standpoint it should be noted that the result 
reached under this theory of true ren·voi or W eiterverweisung 
would depend (I) upon the rule relating to the Conflict of Laws 
prevailing in the foreign country upon the point in question ; ( z) 
upon the further question whether such foreign law itself sanc-
tioned renvoi in one form or another. Assume, for example, that two 
Englishmen, A and B, leave movables in England, and that A dies 
domiciled in Italy, and B in France, 'but without having acquired 
an authorized domicile in the French sense. Under these circum-
stances the Private International Law of both France and Italy 
would require that the property be distributed according to 
English raw. But renvoi, which is sanctioned by the courts of 
France, is not a part of the Italian system of Private Interna-
tional Law. It would follow, granted renvoi in the above 
sense is a part of the law of England, that A's next of kin 
would be actually determined by the English statute of dis-
tributions, while B's next of kin, owing to the fact that renvoi is 
also a part of the French law, would be determined by the 
French statute.39 It is apparent also that in those cases in which 
the law of two foreign countries is involved, as for example in 
the case of legitimation by subsequent marriage under the Eng-
lish rule of Private International Law when the parties have 
changed their domicile between the time of the birth of the child 
""3 Weiss, Traite de droit international prive So. 
"'Dicey, Conflict of Laws (2d ed.), 721-722. So, practically, Piggott, 
Foreign Judgments (3d ed.), II, pp. 263-264. 
35Zitelmann, Professor of the University of Bonn, says that the attain-
ment of a reasonable result being the object of all interpretation, it must 
be assumed, in order to obviate the absurd consequence referred to, to 
have been the legislative intent that there should be only one reference. 
(Intemational Privatrecht, vo!. I, pp. 24o-244.) Zitelmann is followed by 
Klein, 27 Archiv fiir Biirgerliches Recht 266-267. Buzzati's answer to Zitel-
mann is that the interpretation itself must be reasonable, which it is not 
when it is necessary to admit that the same rule of the Conflict of Laws says 
one thing when applied by a foreign judge and the opposite thing when ap-
plied by a national judge. Il Rinvio, 81 (quoted in Bate, Notes on Renvoi 
52). 
""These are the logical results when the local judge is required to de-
cide a case in the same manner as it would be decided by the courts of the 
foreign country. 
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and the marriage, obviously an impossible task would be asked of 
the judge if he were required to let each of them have the last 
word with respect to the matter in controversy. 
Fiore, the distinguished Italian jurist, would allow the applica-
tion of foreign law in its totality in all cases governed by the per-
sonal law of the parties. Following Mancini, he holds that the 
country of which a person is a subject, though he is domiciled in 
another State, should be regarded as the competent legislative 
authority with respect to all matters affecting his person and that 
to the extent such jurisdiction has been exercised by the national 
legislator it must be recognized by all other countries. Hence, if 
the national legislator should prescribe that the lex domicilii shall 
govern in a given case, such direction must be followed.40 
Fiore's deductions would appear to be entirely sound, but his 
assumption regarding the competency of the national legislator 
is in conflict with the generally established law or accepted theory 
on the continent, as well as with the principle of the territoriality 
of the law firmly imbedded in the common law.41 
v. Bar, Professor of International Law at the University of 
Gottingen, and Westlake, contrary to the preceding theories, con-
tend in favor of the application of the lex fori whenever there is 
disagreement in the rules of Private International Law in the coun-
tries concerned. Both conclude that under such circumstances 
there is in reality no conflict at all, but a gap in the legislation 
which the lex fori is called upon to fill as a subsidiary law. West-
1ake's formulation of this theory, which in some respects is more 
logical than that of v. Bar,42 is substantially as follows: 
..,28 Clunet 424-442, 681-704. 
41For an extended analysis and criticism of Fiore's theory see, Laine, 
3 Darras 51-53, 319-335; 5 Darras, 21-24 
.OVVith respect to v. Bar's theory consult his Tlzeorie u1zd Praxis des 
internationalen Privatreclzts, I, pp. 279-281; 2 Holtzendorff's E1zcyclopiidie 
d er Rechtswissensclzaft (6th ed. by Kohler), 19; 8 Niemeyer 177-188; 
18 A11meaire 41, 153-157, 174-175. 
According to the same writer the thought of the legislator in directing 
the application of foreign law is about as follows: "Though I regard my 
Jaw as the better and the more reasonable, it is generally more important to 
aim at international uniformity of treatment even at the risk that objectively 
the result is not so good. If we should desire to apply our law exclusively 
in those cases also in which the legal relationship has a much more import-
ant connection with foreign countries the advantages gained from the ap-
plication of our better law would be out of proportion to the disadvantages 
with respect to international uncertainty of law resulting therefrom. * * * 
Just as I treat foreign law, so shall I also be treated in general. If I ex-
pect and demand that my law shall be taken into consideration by other 
countries, I must as far as possible admit the application of foreign law in 
analogous cases. 
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"A distinction between internal law and international law be-
longs only to the science of law but does not actually exist. Sup-
pose a legislator says (a) that the capacity to make a will shall 
be acquired at the age of 19; (b) that the capacity of persons 
shall be governed by their national law. Rule (a) would have no 
meaning without rule (b). Whose testamentary capacity is ac-
quired at 19? No answer can be given without the aid of rule 
(b) fixing the category of persons whose capacity the legislator 
believes he has a right to fix. According to (b), (a) says that 
the capacity of the subjects of the legislator is acquired at 19, 
but (b) says nothing regarding the capacity of foreigners domi-
ciled within its territory. If rule (b) had said that capacity shall 
be governed by the law of domicile it would have said nothing 
regarding the capacity of its own subjects domiciled abroad. 
"In whatever terms rule (b) may be expressed its true sense 
would be limited to the cases which, according to the ideas of the 
legislator, fall within his ,ilUthority. There are normal cases which 
the legislator deems to belong to hi~ and with regard to which 
he intends to legislate. The Danish legislator, for example, who 
attaches a decisive importance to domicile, will regard as the 
normal case in the matter under discussion a person domiciled 
in Denmark for which he fixes the age at 21. The Italian legis-
lator, on the other hand, attaching a decisive importance to nation-
ality the normal case will be that of an Italian subject and for 
him he fixes the age at 19. 
"A legislator who regards a certain case as normal will regard 
analogous cases as being normal for other legislators and as belong-
ing to them. A Danish legislator, therefore, will direct his judges 
to assign to persons domiciled in a foreign country such capacity. 
as such foreign legislator may have attributed to them, and the 
Italian legislator will do the same with respect to the capacity of 
foreigners which their national legislator has attributed to them. 
' "By means of this second step the Danish legislator disposes 
of persons domiciled in a country whose legislation in the matter 
"We see therefore that the rule of Private International Law, how-
ever closely it may be connected with the rule of substantive law, is never-
theless by no means a pure expression of the applicability of our law; 
that the legislator establishing a certain point of contact for his Private In-
ternational Law is far from asserting that he has no substantive law 
for other cases. 
"The legislator determining the right of succession according to the 
domicile of the deceased says merely: 'For me domicile is a more im-
portant point of contact than nationality or any other principle. I would 
gladly apply my rules concerning succession also to my subjects residing 
abroad, to all property situated in my territory, etc. Yet I know that if 
I want to aim at international uniformity of law I can claim, on principle 
at least, but one point of contact. That being so, I prefer to assure the 
strict application of my rules concerning succession as to those who live 
in my territory. I will rather suffer an application of foreign law to my 
subjects abroad than to admit its application to persons domiciled within 
my territory.' " 
40 !bering's Jahrbiicher fiir die Dogmatik 67-68. 
HeinOnline  -- 10 Colum. L. Rev. 202 1910
202 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW. 
is also based on the lex domicilii. But it does not provide a rule 
for persons domiciled in a country, such as Italy, whose legislation 
is silent as to the capacity of persons domiciled in such jurisdic-
tion. A third step is here necessary, viz., to direct the judge to 
apply in the absence of another law, the normal law. The Dane 
domiciled in Italy will be deemed in Denmark, therefore, to have 
reached the age of testamentary capacity only at 21 and in Italy, 
at the age of 19. 
"As to what the Germans call W eiter'verweisztng, suppose two 
citizens of New York (capacity to contract being governed there 
by the lex loci) enter a contract in Italy, being at that time domi-
ciled in France, and that litigation with respect thereto arises in 
England. The lex fori (England) applying the law of the domi-
cile at the time of the making of the contract to determine the 
capacity of the parties to enter it will refer the matter to France. 
France having adoped .the principle of nationality with respect 
to capacity, will answer: 'The case does not belong to me; it belongs 
to the New York legislator.' Should the English judge, following 
the direction of the French law, ask the New York law it would 
tell him that, in its opinion, the case did not belong either to New 
York, but (under the rule le."C loci) to the Italian legislator. 
"But under rule (b) the English judge need not follow the 
direction given by France to consult New York law. Instead he 
should apply the normal law of his own country, rule (a). The 
judge must determine in the first instance to which country the legal 
relationship presented to him belongs; if the law of the latter, 
based upon another system regarding the Conflict of Laws, says 
that the case does not belong to it, there is no further reference to 
the law of a third state."43 
A necessary consequence of the theory propounded by v. Bar 
and Westlake is that it must lead to the rejection of Weiterver-
weiswzg (transmission). By regarding the aims of the science of 
Private International Law as confined to a determination of the 
limits of the application of the domestic law without a correspond-
ing definition of the application of the foreign law, they are led 
to the view that whenever the rules of Private International Law 
of two countries differ there is in reality no provision in either leg-
islation regarding the point in question; hen.ce, the judge of the 
forum, being under an obligation to render a decision in the case, 
has no recourse except that of applying the lex fori. 
Without dwelling upon the singular results44 that would be 
obtained if Westlake's theory that there is in reality no positive 
"'The above is a condensed statement of Westlake's note to the In-
stitute of International Law. See rS Annuaire 35-40. See also, Westlake, 
Private International Law (4th ed.), 25-40. 
"For example, the majority of an Englishman domiciled in Italy would 
have to be determined in Germany (lex patrice) by the German law relating 
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conflict but merely a mutual disclaimer of jurisdiction became 
accepted law, it is easy to show that it rests upon premises which 
lack all real support. His point of departure-that there is an 
inseparable connection between the rules of Private International 
Law of a given country and its internal or territorial law, so that, 
according to the real intention of the legislator, the former must 
be deemed to define the limits of the latter's application, cannot 
be admitted. In Roman Law, for example, there were no rules of 
Private International Law in the proper sense; hence it would ap-
pear that the Roman legislator enacted laws without reference to • 
their application in space. As to the modern continental countries, 
notwithstanding the fact that the science of Private International 
Law has been known to them since the fourteenth century, their 
present codes, almost without exception, contain such scant provi-
sions relating to the Conflict of Laws that an assertion that the 
legislator in adopting a rule of internal law in reality defined its 
operation in space by the corresponding rule of Private Interna-
tional Law is an absurdity. In most instances no such rule of 
Private International Law could be found in any law. And with 
respect to England and the United States the unsoundness of 
Westlake's contention is all the more apparent for the reason that 
the law of England was fully developed before the rules relating 
to the Conflict of Laws, taken over from the continent, became a 
part thereof. With what show of reason can it be said then that 
the two are one and inseparable ?45 Laws are enacted by a leg-
to majority, for the reason that both England (le.1: domicilii) and Italy (le.1: 
patriO!) would be deemed to have declined jurisdiction. 
Buzzati gives another illustration: Suppose, he says, State A ap-
plies the lex rei sitO! to immovables, the lex domicilii to movables, and 
the lex loci actus to the form of wills. The law of B is the same except 
that the national law of the deceased shall govern the distribution of his 
movables. A subject of State A dies domiciled in State B, leaving a 
will executed in B. His estate is composed of movables and of immovable 
property situated in State B. A judge of A has to decide in regard to 
the disposition of his estate. The law of B concerning testamentary and 
intestate succession being proved, the judge would apply its provisions 
regarding the form of the will and those relating to the immovable 
property, but when he came to the movable property, he would have to 
assume that there was a gap-that is, that the provisions of State B re-
garding the distribution of personal property do not exist. 8 Niemeyer 
455· 
"'Bate, in his Notes on Renvoi 87-107, maintains the following thesis: 
"When once a jural relation, or an element therein, is perceived to be out-
side the dominion of the [territorial] law of England, it is deemed by 
English courts to be in the dominion of International Law, and not in 
the dominion of any other legal system." 
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islator without any thought of their operation in space.46 The 
object of the science of the Private International Law of a par-
ticular country is to fix the limits of the application of the terri-
torial law of such country, but its aim is not restricted to this. It 
includes also the determination of the foreign law applicable in 
those cases in which the lex fori does not control. Otherwise the 
courts of the forum would be left by the national legislator with-
out a guide as to the applicatory law in that class of cases. Nor 
can the application of the territorial law of a foreign country be 
made dependent upon the wishes of the foreign legislator. If its 
enforcement rested upon mere comity or courtesy to such foreign 
State and not upon considerations of justice and international con-
venience, the substitution of the lex fori for a foreign law which 
did not care to govern, might be regarded as a voluntary with-
drawal of an offer or unappreciated courtesy extended to such for-
eign country rather than as resulting from the commands of the 
foreign sovereign.47 But, inasmuch as the application of foreign 
law under modern conditions has become a jural necessity,48 it 
.. Kahn, 30 !bering's Jahrbiicher fiir die Dogmatik 29-30, has attempted 
to show that in comparison with the rules of internal law those of Private 
International Law possess ordinarily a subordinate character. 
4
'See ·weiss, 18 Amwaire 151. ('Why not accept the gift when the for-
eign law yields to the lex fori? Why be more of a royalist than the king?); 
I Rolin, Principes du droit international prive 259. ('Why be more cath-
olic than the pope?) 
48Savigny, Private International Law (Guthrie's trans!.), 27-29; Laine, 
Introduction mt droit international prive 19-44. 
The old theory of comity or courtesy, first propounded by the Dutch 
jurists, Huber and Voet, and accepted in England as the basis of its 
Conflict of Laws, has given way there, as well as in the United States 
to-day, to that of jural necessity. 
Courts resort to the law of another country "not ex comitate, but ex 
debito justitice." Lord Brougham in Warrender v. Warrender (1835) 2 
CI. & F. 488, 530. 
"The application of foreign law is not a matter of caprice or option; 
it does not arise from the desire of the sovereign of England, or of any 
other sovereign, to show courtesy to other states. It flows from the im-
possibility of otherwise determining whole classes of cases without gross 
inconvenience and injustice to litigants, whether natives or foreigners." 
Dicey, Conflict of Laws (2d ed.), IO-II. 
"The true foundation on which the administration of International 
Law must rest is, that the rules which are to govern are those which arise 
from the mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the inconvenience 
which would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral 
necessity to do justice, in order that justice may be done to us in return." 
Story, Conflict of Laws (8th ed.), sec. 35· 
"Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, 
on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. 
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the 
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard 
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own 
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws." 
Mr. Justice Gray in Hilton ~·. Guyot (1895) 159 U. S. II3, 163-164. 
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follows, in view of the absence of a common superior, that each 
sovereign State, in accordance with its own sense of duty, both 
to its own inhabitants and to the rest of the world, must designate 
the law which, based upon the nature of things, shall settle the con-
troversy.49 To leave the final decision of a case to a foreign law-
giver means, in reality, nothing less than an abdication of sover-
eignty and a failure on the part of a State to discharge the duties 
owed to its inhabitants.50 As a result it may happen that the 
courts of one State will determine the rights of litigants with ref-
erence to the law of a foreign country when such country itself 
would not so determine them. But, unfortunate as this is, it will 
happen whether renvoi is adopted or not, as long as there are dif-
ferences in the rules of Private International Law. 
A number of authors have advocated renvoi in the belief that 
it would tend toward greater international harmony in the law-
the ultimate aim of the science of Private International Law.51 
Such an assumption, however, is unwarranted. Suppose, again, 
that A, a citizen of the United States, formerly a resident of New 
York, dies domiciled in Italy, and the question as to who is en-
titled to his personal estate left in New York arises before a New 
York judge. If renvoi is rejected the New York judge would 
·distribute the property, of course, according to the Italian 
statute of distributions (lex domicilii). The Italian courts, on the 
·Other hand, by reason of their principle of nationality, would apply 
the New York statute of distributions. If renvoi is adopted, the 
New York courts would apply the New York statute of distribu-
""Renvoi, in effect, in whatever manner it be understood, involves 
the influence, more or less direct and effective, of the state whose law is 
.declared applicable upon the international law of the state which declares 
it applicable." Laine, 3 Darras, 332. 
The argument that the foreign law, having jurisdiction under the les 
fori, has created rights which must be recognized involves in effect a 
petitio prillcipii. The very question is whether the les fori should recog-
nize alleged rights created not by the territorial law of the foreign country 
referred to, but by that of another state which is incompetent under the 
lex fori. 
""Audinet, S. I899, 2, !05; Bartin, 30 Revzee de droit international et de 
legislation comparee 295; Bustamante, I7 A11nuaire 220; Catellani, IS An-
nuaire I70; Chretien, I3 Clunet I74 n. 2; I Gierke, Deutsches Privatreclzt 
.2I4; Klein, 27 Arclziv fur burgerliclzes Rec/zt 273; Labbe, I2 Clunet I2; 
Laine, 23 Clunet 256; 3 Danas, 334-335; Laurent, S. I88I, 4, 42; Olivi, 
Revue de droit international et de legislation comparee, I900, pp. 3I-32; 
Pic, D. I899, 2, 4IO; Pillet, Droit international prive 24I-242. 
01Chausse, 24 Clunet 23; Revue critique de legislation et de jurispru-
dence I888, p. I97; I Dernburg, Das biirgerliclze Rec/zt !03; 2 Vareilles-Som-
mieres, La sy11tlzese du droit international prive 98; 3 Weiss, Traite de 
.droit international prive SI; IS Amwaire I5I. 
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tions and the Italian courts the Italian statute.52 There is no 
identity of result.53 Each country has simply been forced to dis-
tribute the property according to a statute which, in the nature 
of things, it deemed inapplicable. Renvoi or no renvoi, such in-
consistencies will remain. Uniformity of decision cannot be ob-
tained until the elimination of the differences in the systems of 
Private International Law through international agreement. 
It follows that whenever the question as to the creation of 
rights under the law of a foreign country arises before the tribu-
nals of another State the existence or non-existence of such rights 
depends, properly speaking, not upon the will of the foreign law-
giver, but upon the lex fori, which must be deemed to have adopted 
the foreign internal or territorial law for the purpose. 
It may thus be said that 1·envoi is insupportable in theory, and 
that it offers no real advantage to recommend its adoption on 
grounds of expediency. Courts that have sanctioned renvoi seem 
to have done so as a convenient means to escape the necessity of 
applying foreign law, a task often of considerable difficulty, but 
they have forgotten that this apparent gain, even if Westlake's 
theory were adopted, can be had only after proof of the existence 
of a different rule governing the Conflict of Laws in the foreign 
country. The burden upon the judge would, in fact, be increased 
and not diminished, for he would be obliged, to some extent at 
least, to acquaint himself with the rules of Private International 
Law prevailing in foreign countries."4 Concerning our own Con-
flict of Laws, it has been said by Mr. Justice Porter in Saul v. His 
Creditors,55 that the questions relating thereto "are the most em-
"'This statement is based upon the actual decisions in the various coun-
tries with regard to renvoi. If the rules of Private International Law of 
both New York and Italy should compel the local judge to regard himself 
as sitting in the foreign country we should have the same result as if 
renvoi were no part of the law of either country. 
"'That renvoi will not promote the execution of foreigu judgments 
has been shown by Bartin, 30 Revue de droit international et de legislation 
comparee 139-157. See also, Bartin, D. 1888, 2, 28; Buzzati, 18 Ammaire 
152. 
,.The extent would depend upon the theory adopted by the courts. 
Should ·westlake's theory prevail, the lex- fori would become applicable upon 
mere proof that the corresponding rule governing the Conflict of Laws in 
the foreign country was different from that of the forum. If renvoi in 
the stricter sense, inclusive of Weiterverweisung, obtained, the judge of 
the forum might be compelled, according to circumstances, to investigate 
the Private International Law of several countries, and to decide the case 
after all, not according to the lex- fori, but according to the internal or terri-
torial law of some foreign country. 
"(La. 1827) 5 Martin (N. s.) 569. 
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barrassing and difficult of decision that can occupy the attention 
of those who preside in courts of justice." How hopelessly em-
barrassing would they become if the additional burden of apply-
ing the Private International Law of any country of the civilized 
world were placed upon the shoulders of our judges ?56 
(To be concluded.) 
ERNEST G. LoRENZEN. 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY. 
'"The fundamental nature of the differences in their systems of Private 
International Law and especially the uncertainty of their rules relating to 
public policy make the application of foreign law as a whole practically an 
impossible task. 
